Weather And Market Disasters
Were Acid Test For Farm Bill
By Jose G. Peña
Extension Economist
When Congress passed the Freedom to Farm Act during
midsummer 1996, little did they or farm supporters know
or realize that an acid test of that concept began that
same year and that the concept would start to unravel by
early fall of 1998.
The concept behind Farm Bill '96 was that the
government's role to stabilize prices and help manage
production risk through deficiency payments and planting
controls would decrease substantially and allow the capitalistic
market system to influence farmers' decisions. The idea
was that if left to take production signals from
the market, farmers wouldn't plant hundreds of acres of a
crop that was already in surplus just because of an
artificial, government-supported price, or because the
farmer had to comply to stay eligible for future farm
subsidy payments.
Most production controls were removed starting in
1996. Farmers were provided payments, which started in
1996 and are scheduled to terminate in 2002, amounting to
about 85 percent of their historic farm subsidy payments
as part of a "transition" to a free market
system. The thinking was that during the transition
period, and especially after Farm Bill '96 was fully
implemented, farmers would either adjust by
finding something else to grow that was profitable
or go out of business.
While the drouth of 1996 had a severe impact on
ranchers in the south central part of the U.S. as a
result of a cattle market collapse, prices for most farm
commodities were high and the U.S. farm economy survived
the first year's test relatively unscathed. The following
year, 1997, was one of the most productive years of the
last 20 for agriculture, with relatively good commodity
prices and the cattle market showing signs of recovery.
The adjustment seemed to be on course.
Then came 1998, which will go down in history as one
of the most economically difficult years in Texas
agriculture. A severe drouth during the first half of the
year caused lost production, livestock liquidations and a
host of other problems, such as aflatoxin contamination
in corn, which are still haunting the agriculture sector.
The drouth was followed by excessive rains, causing
flooding which, in turn, caused additional losses to
livestock, property and the rural infrastructure.
These problems were intensified significantly by a
meltdown of agriculture markets. Prices for corn, for
example, are about 40 percent of the price levels of 1996
when Farm Bill '96 passed. Prices for sorghum, wheat and
soybeans followed similar patterns. Drouth-induced
livestock liquidation caused a downturn of cattle, sheep
and goat markets, not to mention wool and mohair markets
which remain at record lows.
The collapse of U.S. farm commodity prices has been
fueled by a bumper crop in the rest of the U.S. and
substantially lower exports due to the economic crisis in
Southeast Asia and Russia. The U.S. annually
depends on exports to market about one-third of its
agriculture production. U.S. corn and soybean production
in 1998 were the second and highest, respectively, crops
on record.
The agricultural commodity market collapse indicates
that the prices the world markets will pay for U.S.
agricultural commodities will likely remain low as long
as there are ample supplies. U.S. farmers' skills
under modern production systems indicate that
production will continue at a high level. A recent survey
of seed suppliers, for example, indicates that based on
seed orders for the coming year, U.S. plantings and
planting mixes will approximate 1998 levels.
While the general feeling among livestock producers is
that government subsidies did not apply to them, farm
program activities had a big impact on livestock prices.
Although the government has never supported livestock
prices directly, in the past it supported the livestock
industry with grain supply management activities which
kept feed prices from swinging widely. When a grain glut
threatened to collapse the market, USDA would curb
production through set-aside provisions in the old farm
bill. Farm Bill '96 eliminated all supply management
activities, consequently farm commodities as well as
livestock prices are swinging more widely.
As a result, after much heated negotiations between
the Democrats and Republicans, the 1999 Omnibus
Appropriation Act, signed into law on October 21, 1998,
began to undo some of the rigorous transition to a
complete free market system in agriculture. The $5.9
billion package of emergency aid will help farmers hit by
low prices as well as farmers who suffered weather
problems.
While a large portion of the Freedom to Farm concept
was left in place, the bill increased the transition
payments by 50 percent for 1998 only. And, while the farm
aid package is temporary, it is clearly sparing farmers
some of the discipline of transitioning to a total free
market system.
In addition, Congress softened some of its get-tough
policies included in Farm Bill '96, especially in areas
concerning insurance. Through Farm Bill '96, Congress had
ruled that if a farmer refused to buy crop insurance, he
or she waived the right to any disaster aid in case of
drouth or other crop failure. The bill reverses that
position by giving the agriculture secretary discretion
to grant crop-failure aid even to the uninsured.
The deregulatory process could be further compromised
if special interest groups press for another farm aid
package next year.
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